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IN THE SUPREME COURT

I

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

l

CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE
husband and wife,

(

DUGAl~,

I

/t

Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants
Cross-Defendants and Respondents,

vs.
LUTHER EUGENE JONES and BETTY
ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife,
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,:
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ThirdParty Counter-Defendants and
Appellants,

.\
I

\1

vs.

I
t

Case No. 16334
O. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN
STILSON, UNITED Fli.RM AGENCY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants,
Counter-Claimants, FourthParty Plaintiffs, and Respondents,

vs.
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN
husband and wife,
Fourth-Party Defendants and
Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants
Cross-Defendants and Respondents,
vs.
LUTHER EUGENE JONES and BETTY
ELVIRA JONES, husband and wife,
Defendants, Counter-Claimants,:
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ThirdParty Counter-Defendants and
Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 16334
O. B. OBERHANSLY, LESTER CLAN
STILSON, UNITED FARM AGENCY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendants,
Counter-Claimants, FourthParty Plaintiffs, and Respondents,
vs.
CARL C. DUGAN and LOUISE DUGAN
husband and wife,
Fourth-Party Defendants and
Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
These defendants do not dispute appellants' characterizalion of the case except to explain that the action of the
third-party defendants, who are also fourth-party plaintiffs
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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against the fourth-party defendants, Dugans, has been resolved,
Dugans, having paid the judgment awarded the fourth-party
plaintiffs, therefore, that matter is not at issue on this
appeal.

The disposition in the lower court, therefore, must

be corrected accordingly to reflect the judgment awarded to
the fourth-party plaintiff against the fourth-party defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
These defendants seek to have the judgment of the trial
court confirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts as recited by the appellants is
deficient in the following particulars:
The appellants failed to mention that the information
related to the Jones by Mr. Oberhansly was based entirely
upon representations made to Oberhansly by the Dugans.
265, 266, 411)

(R.

Oberhansly did not know that there was a

discrepancy between the amount of acreage stated in the
listing agreement as given to him by the Dugans and the
amount of acreage that was in fact included in the contract
between the Dugans to the Jones.

(R. 411, 412)

The transaction between the parties was closed in the
office of the seller's attorney, Mr. John Beaslin,

in

Vernal, Utah, and the third-party defendants were not present,
nor were they requested to do anything toward completing the
sale of the property.

The deed descriptions were obtained

by Mr. Beaslin or others.

(R. 439)

These defendants had

no knowledge of the contents of the closing documents and in
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fact had no knowledge that Dugans had not given Jones an
acre of ground for a separate home site.

Further, they had

no knowledge that the description contained in the deed was
in any respect at variance with the acreage described in the
listing agreement or as set forth in the deposit receipt and
agreement of sale.

At the closing, Jones inspected the

documents and made no claim against the Dugans and raised no
objection to the fact that there was a discrepancy in acreage,
or that they did not receive clear title to a parcel of
ground of approximately an acre for the purpose of construeting a home.

These facts were unknown to these defendants

at the time but are reflected in the record.

(Mrs. Jones

deposition, pp. 25, 26)
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING APPELLANTS' REQUEST FOR JURY TRIAL.
The appellants were not entitled to a jury trial for
two reasons:
1.

The issues before the court were primarily equit-

able, and
2.

The appellants failed to make a timely demand for a

jury trial.
In non-federal jurisdictions the general rule obtains
that it is discretionary with the trial court to grant a
jury trial when there is a mixed question of law and equity.
The trial court, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
<1Ptermine the primary nature of the case and try the case in
accordance with its determination.

If the issues are primarily
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equitable, the trial court is totally within its perogative
in refusing a jury trial.

State

Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey,

565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977); Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc. 18
Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 529
P.2d 803 (Utah 1974); Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327
p. 2d 2 50 ( 19 58 ) .
The appellants lay great stress on the Beacon Theatres
case which is a federal decision.

The appellants fail to

explain to the court that under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure if there be any legal question the litigant has an
absolute right to a jury trial.

(FRCP 38)

This generally

has been the federal interpretation, however, the federal
rule concerning jury trial does not apply to state jurisdictions and Utah has always adhered to the general rule above
stated.

47 Am.Jur.2d

Jury, §9; Holland, supra, State Bank

of Lehi, supra., Sweeney, supra.

It is, therefore, obvious

that appellants prime authority is not in point as a matter
of law.
It is the fundamental precept of law that the foreclosure
of a mortgage is strictly and exclusively an equitable
remedy.

State Bank of Lehi, supra.

That, of course, was

the nature of the initial complaint and the basis for this
proceeding.

The court pretrial requested Mr. Holland,

appellants' counsel, to explain what he wanted in his complaint.
Colloquy between the court and counsel for appellants is as
follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-4-OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: Okay. What do you want to accomplish,
aside from resisting the action to foreclose, what
do you want to have happen?
MR. HOLLAND: I either want 16 and, lets see,
what would that be, about 16 and four-tenths, three
point five acres.
THE COURT: They haven't got it, have they?
MR. HOLLAND: No, but maybe they should get
it.
THE COURT:
How could they get it?
MR. HOLLAND: They could buy it from the
adjacent people in the adjacent property.
THE COURT: Well I'm not sure that that's
practical.
But do you want the reformation of any
instrument?
MR. HOLLAND: No. I think we just sued generally
rather than for specific money damages.
THE COURT: What are you suing for specific
performance on?
MR. HOLLAND: For the balance of the property.
(Pre-trial R. p. 9, lines 3-25)
The right to specific performance of a contract is
equitable.

Fischer v. Johnson, 525 P.2d 45 (Utah 1974),

Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963), conseqquently, the plaintiff had asked for equitable relief in the
foreclosure of the mortgage and the defendants had asked for
equitable relief in the form of specific performance.

Both

were equitable questions and were the primary issues of the
litigation, consequently, the court was entirely within its
perogative in declining the defendants request for jury
trial.

Bradshaw, supra.; Holland, supra.; State Bank of Lehi,

supra.; Sweeney, supra.
Addressing the second point, the case was commenced in
January, 1977.

Pretrial hearing was conducted on January

24, 1978, at which time all of the parties were represented.
At that time the following colloquy took place:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE COURT: Alright. Well, I guess you have
got a lawsuit. What about a jury? Mortgage foreclosure.
You are not entitled to one.
MR. NASH:
No, we don't want a jury.
THE COURT: When do you want to try it, since
you are the plaintiff, and you the main defendant,
and you just going along for the ride?
MR. HOLLAND: Depending on when it's set is
who will be assisting me in trial, and we'll file
a notice with the court at that time.
THE COURT: Alright.
MR. HOLLAND:
From my office.
THE COURT:
If I set it today there will be a
trial setting.
MR. HOLLAND:
Yes, I understand that, your
Honor.
THE COURT: O.K.
Now when can't you try it?
(Pre-trial R., p. 30, lines 19-30, p. 31, lines 1-6)
It is obvious that at the time of the pretrial Mr. Holland
did not demand a jury even though he knew that the case was
going to be tried by the court without a jury.
The case, in fact, was not tried on April 17th and 18th
but was continued a number of times until December 5, 1978,
when it was actually tried.

On

September 18, 1978, the

defendants, Jones, filed a request for a jury trial.
156, 157)

(R.

The third-party defendants promptly filed an

objection to a demand for a jury trial on the basis that the
issues in the case were primarily equitable.
Each party filed memorandums of authority.

(R. 158, 159)
The court reviewed

the memorandums and took the matter in advisement and entered
a minute order declining to grant a trial by jury.
court's order was entered November 24, 1978.

The

( R. 161)

It should be noted that the matter had been set for
trial twice before the date the defendants' demand for jury
trial had been received.

The previous trial dates had been
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vacated for the convenience of the parties.

The Court was

within its perogative in determining that the request of the
defendant was untimely in light of the fact that the matter
had been pending, ready for trial for the most of the year
and that the defendant had made no substantial showing of the
right to a jury trial.
In the case, Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045
(1955), the appellants made a demand for jury trial more
than a month after the hearing for trial date.

In refusing

the appellant's request, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides:
"A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demand."
The effect of this provision has been interpreted in
the Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West, 55
Utah 357, 186 P.ll4 and Thompson v. Anderson, 107
Utah 331, 153 P.2d 665, holding that a litigant not
making demand for a jury trial as required by court
rule has no right to a jury trial and that the matter
becomes one of discretion of the court. Where, as here,
no valid excuse for the failure to make the demand
timely was offered, there is no abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in denying a latter demand.
(See also Christensen v. Cordova, 24 Utah 2d 132, 467
p . 2d 4 0 5 ( 19 7 0 ) ) •
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED THE INTRODUCTION
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY BY APPELLANTS
At the time of the pre-trial on January 24, 1978, the
parties all represented to the court that they were ready
for trial.

(Pre-trial R. pp. 30, 31)

The pre-trial proceeding

was extensive and the third-party defendants ordered a copy
of the transcript from the reporter so that the rulings of
the Court pertaining to the manner in which the trial would
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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be conducted would be preserved.

The Court did not require

any of the parties to prepare a written pretrial order nor
did the Court itself prepare a pretrial order.

The question

of calling witnesses, however, were important to all of the
parties, therefore it was presumed by third-party defendants
that each of the counsel present took copius notes of the
requirements of the Court.

At least counsel for the third-

party defendants was aware of the pre-trial orders of the
court.

In preparing for trial it would have been necessary

for the third-party defendants to obtain expert witnesses
for the purposes of meeting expert testimony which may have
been proffered by the defendants.

While two of the third-

party defendants are in fact experts in the real estate
business and could have testified in any respect, nevertheless,
they were parties and would have desired to have independent
experts available for issues that may have been raised by
the expert witnesses, if any, of the defendants.

For that

reason, there was specific mention at the pre-trial conference of the question of damages and the manner of proof.
The colloquy between the court and counsel pertaining to the
issues raised by appellant on this point is as follows:
THE COURT: All right. I am going to order you
as part of this pretrial order to furnish the names
of the witnesses, the expert witnesses that you will
call with regard to damages not later than 15 days
prior to the time of trial.
MR. HOLLAND:
I understand, your Honor.
THE COURT: O.K.
Now do you intend to call
any experts at this time, Mr. Nash?
MR. NASH:
I don't believe so.
THE COURT:
How about you Mr. Valentine?
MR. VALENTINE: We have no intent at this time,
your Honor, but will comply with the court's order
Sponsored
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
and bydo
that.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE COURT:
If you do then you will be
required to furnish the names within ten days prior
to that time; the difference being whether you call
them or whether you don't may depend on the ones
that he intends to call.
MR. VALENTINE:
Yes.
THE COURT:
For that reason, he can furnish
them to you first, since he is going to have to
carry the burden of proof in that regard.
(Pretrial R., p. 28, lines 14-30, p. 29, lines 1-4)
As a matter of clarification, Mr. Valentine, was appearing
for the third-party defendants.
It is apparent that everyone understood the requirement
of furnishing the names of expert witnesses.
mean or inconsequential duty.

It was not a

The ability of the plaintiff

and the third-party defendants to defend the issues presented
was directly related to the type and character of testimony
and evidence proffered.

When defendants failed to name expert

witnesses the other parties to the action had a right to rely
upon there being no need for them to obtain rebuttal experts
and, therefore, they themselves abandoned their opportunities
to defend against plaintiff's expert witnesses.
POINT III
THE APPELLANTS AND PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS WERE COMPETENT
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AS TO THE VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY
The third-party defendants do not dispute the general
contention of the appellants on this point.

We merely state

that the facts and the law do not correspond.
The appellants attempted to establish the value of the
property by having Mrs. Jones tell the court what their
excludecl expert witness, llr. Carroll, would have testified.
The court properly excluded her attempt to paraphrase or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding of
for digitization
provided by witness.
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
characterize
the Law
testimony
an expert
Mrs.
Jones
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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did not have any independent opinion as to the value of the
property (R. 381, 382), and there was no other evidence
introduced directly on the point.

Furthermore the court was

not obligated to attach any credence to the appellants
attempt to determine value by an oblique reference to the
value of the improvements, thereby concluding that the difference between the sale price of the property and that which
was testified to be the value of certain improvements must,
therefore, be the acreage value of the land.

The court was

the trier of fact and it is axiomatic that where there is evidence in conflict or testimony proffered of such dubious quality
as to be improbable, the court is not bound to attach any significance to such testimony as desired by the appellant.
POINT IV
THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS DID lJOT BREACH
ANY DUTY OWED TO THE THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS.
The citations submitted by the appellants are not disputed except in their application to the facts.

The diffi-

culty with the appellants position is that there was no intentional reckless misrepresentation of a material fact by the
defendants.

Appellants simply want to impute liability to

these defendants for what was apparently a mistake in the acreage owned by the plaintiffs.

The sweeping assertions of the

appellants simply do not apply, third-party defendants will
address this argument under four subpoints:
A.

In misrepresentation cases a real estate agent is

not required to act as a fiduciary towards prospective
purchasers of his principal's property.
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Utah Law is well settled that in misrepresentation cases
a real estate agent does not woe a fiduciary duty to all
petential purchasers of his principal's property.

Raterh,

the disparity in experience and business activity between such
parties is one of several elements to consider, including purchaser's diligence in investigating the truthfulness of the
broker's statement.
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the defendants
were they could not close their eyes and accept
unquestioningly any representations made to them.
It was their duty to make such investigation and
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances
would dictate;
• Lewis v. ~~hite 2 Utah 2d
101, 103, 104, 269 P.2d 865, 866 (1954)
A potential purchaser of real estate cannot blindly rely on a
broker's statement as would be the case if he were the purchaser's
fiduciary.

37 Am.Jur.

2d Fraud and Deceit,

§§

253, 254.

The authorities cited by the appellants in support of
their fiduciary theory are either inapplicable to or distinguishable from the present controversy.

First, appellants

references to U.C.A. section 61-2-6 is irrelevant since this
statute, by its very terms, deals solely with the licensing
of real estate brokers by the state; it has nothing to do
with alleged fraudulent transactions between a broker and a
private party.

Second, the cited Florida case is not con-

trolling in this state, and it conflicts with the clearly
applicable standard outlined in Lewis v. White, supra.
Third, Greig v. Interstate Investment Co., 253 P. 877 (Ore.
1927), is distinguishable from the present action since the
misrepresentation in that case concerned the dollar value of the
~urchased
amount
wasprovided
never
Sponsored by property,
the S.J. Quinney Lawwhich
Library. Funding
for digitization
by the received
Institute of Museumfrom
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

the seller rather calculated solely by the broker.

Fourth,

Motter v. Bateman, 18 Utah 2d 335, 423 P.2d 153 (1967),
merely recites the previously discussed rule outlined in
Lewis v. White.

Fifth, all references to Mr. Stilson's testi-

mony at a previous State Administrative hearing are inadmissable hearsay since they fail to qualify under Rule 63(3){b)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and especially because Mr. Stilson was fully available for questioning when his deposition
was taken.

Sixth, the language of the Utah Supreme Court in

Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1948), clearly
indicates that a real estate agent has a fiduciary duty only
to the principal who engages his services.

In application to

this case the meaning is clear that the duty of respondents
flowed solely to Dugan, and they, as seller's agent, owed no
such duty to buyer Jones.

E.g. Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263,

300 P.2d 623 (1956); 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §84.
B.

Oberhansly acted in good faith with justifiable

reliance and, therefore, cannot be held liable for the mistake of
Dugan or even the fraud of Dugan if such be the case.
The law clearly states that unless a real estate agent
has some reason to know that the fact which he is listing is
untrue, he cannot be held responsible or liable for his principles misrepresentations.

Smith v. Pearmain, 548 P.2d 1269

(Utah 1976) (by implication); Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379,
384 P.2d 802 (1963); Graham v. Ellmore, 135 C.A. 129, 26 P.2d
646 (1933); Carpenter v. Egli, 272 Ore. 337, 536 P.2d 1236 (1975)
(by implication); see also 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §108 and 27 A.L.R.
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The primary issue in this case is whether the thirdparty defendants willfully and knowingly misrepresented the
number of acres owned by Mr. Dugan.

If this crucial element

is lacking, the third-party defendants cannot be held liable
for fraud.

37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit §188.

As stated above, the prevailing view in both this state
and in other jurisdictions support the proposition that a
real estate agent will be held liable for fraud only if he
knowingly participates in the actual fraudulent act: innocent
involvement is not actionable.
The main paoint urged is that the judgment must be
entered also against a real estate salesmen when
both he and the owner have made a false representation,
even though the salesmen believes the statement made
to have been true, and even though the same representation
had been made to him by the owner.

*

*

*

*

*

*

While in the instant case the court found that the
statement made by the salesmen was untrue, it was
also found that he believed it to be true, that he
did not know of the existence of the other incumbrance, and that he had been told by the owner that
only one incumbrance existed.
The facts in connection with the condition of this
title were peculiarly within the knowledge of the onwer,
the salesmen was as much deceived by the owner as was
the other party to the transaction, and in one sense it
was no more unnatural or unreasonable for the salesmen
to examine the records than for the respondents to make
the same error.
In effect, the court found that, while
the agents made the statement and that it was false, it
was neither willfully made nor fraudulent so far as he
was concerned, since he knew nothing of the other incumbrance, and since he was justified by his information
in thinking the title was as represented. Also in
effect, the court found that the appellants relied upon
the statements innocently made by the salesmen and
wrongfully and knowingly made by the owner." Graham v.
Ellmore, 135 C.A. 129, 26 P.2d 696 697 (1933); 37 Am.
Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §322.
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In the present case the two key parties to the listing
agreement, Mr. Dugan and Mr. Oberhansly, both testified that
the defendants received the incorrect 22 3/4 acreage figure
directly from Mr. Dugan.

(R. 265, 266, 411, 412)

The pre-

cise number of acres was thus "solely within the knowledge
of the owner," and, with no reason to doubt the figure,
these defendants "believed the statement to have been true;"
consequently, they were "as much deceived by the owner as was
the other party to the transaction" and certainly cannot be
held liable for willfully and knowingly misrepresenting the
number of acres in Mr. Dugan's property.

Rather, the author

of this 22 3/4 acre figure, Mr. Dugan, and not his innocent
agent, Oberhansly, should be held responsible for the injuries,
if any, suffered by these appellants.
C.

Stilson must be dismissed from the case as a

matter of law since he did not actively participate in any
fraud or misrepresentation and cannot be held liable simply
because he was Oberhansly's supervisor.
Respecting this point, the third-party defendants take
exception to the reference by the appellants to a portion of
the transcript before the Security Commission which was not a
matter of record at the trial, which is out of context, and to
which these defendants have had no opportunity to present
evidence or testimony.

The third-party defendants exception

is to the references contained on page 19 of the appellants'
brief.
The material allegations of appellants' complaint against
Stilson
first,
two
counts
misrepresentation
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Stilson's agent Oberhansly, and second, one count of
negligent supervision of said agent.
Regarding the negligence count, the third-party defendants note that they were employed solely by the seller to
sell the land and not by the appellants to purchase it,
consequently, their fiduciary duty ran to Dugan, and they,
as sellers agent owed no such duty to buyer/appellant Jones.
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956).

Appel-

lants thus cannot assert a negligence claim against the
seller's agent's supervisor Stilson for improper supervision.
Brink v. Martin, 50 Wash.2d 256, 310 P.2d 870 (1957); see also
Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon, 92 Cal.Rptr. 162, 479 P.2d
362 (1971).
The misrepresentation counts against Stilson are equally
without legal and factual foundation.

A supervisor of an

employee cannot be held liable for his salesmen's misrepresentations unless he actively participates in the actual fraudulent act.

E.g. Lawrence v. Tye, 46 Ca.2d 877, 116 P.2d 180

(1941); see also 32 A.L.R.

231 §26.

The cases are agreed that a director or officer of
a corporation is not liable, merely because of his
official character for the fraud or false representations of the other officers or agents of the corporation or for fraud attributable to the corporation
itself, if such director or officer is not personally
connected with the wrong and does not participate in
it.
37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit §322; see also 19
Am.Jur.2d Corporat1ons §1348.
The depositions in the instant case clearly demonstrate
that Stilson was in no way involved in the alleged misrepresentations.

The appellants concede that they never met Stilson

until
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pired.

Their first meeting with Stilson was at a Securities

Exchange Commission hearing wherein the same matters contained
in appellants' complaint were aired before an administrative
law judge.

(Mr. Jones deposition page 81, lines 5-14)

At

that time, Stilson appeared on behalf of defendant United Farm
as its broker in Utah but for no other reason.
Stilson did not participate in any way in the sale of the
Dugan property to the appellants.

(Mr. Jones deposition page

81, lines 15-25, page 82, lines l-7)

It was not until over

three years after the sale had been consummated that Mr.
Stilson learned of the complaint of the appellants.

(Mrs.

Jones deposition, p. 31, lines 15-21); (Stilson deposition,
p. 7, lines 17-25)

Appellants cannot and do not have any

claim against Stilson upon which relief could be granted.
He was properly dismissed from the case as a matter of law.
D.

Appellants have waived any claim of fraud or

breach of duty against third-party defendants.
After the initial Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale
(Def. Ex. 5) was executed on February 24, 1973, these thirdparty defendants had very little to do with the transaction
except to act as a conduit for one or two communications between Dugan as seller and Jones as buyer.

There were other

communications between the sellers and buyers to which the
third-party defendants were in no way privy.
The sellers and buyers independently arranged for the
closing of the transaction at the office of the sellers
attorney,

~lr.

John Beaslin in Vernal, Utah.

(R. 358, 359)
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Mr. Beaslin apparently secured information concerning the
description of the property and prepared the warranty deed
from Dugan to Jones dated July 2, 1973, and the mortgage from
Jones to Dugan bearing the same date.

(R. 439)

There appar-

ently was no reference whatsoever to a parcel of land to be
excluded from the mortgage or to be subordinated to the mortgage.

Apparently, the appellants made no objection to the

description of property either in its size or to the fact
that there was not an acre separated from the security provisions.

(R. 361)

The appellants had in fact occupied the premises from
June of 1973 and apparently were cognizant of its dimensions
at the time the deed and mortgage were executed.

(Mr. Jones

deposition, page 46, lines 3-9)
Furthermore, the testimony and evidence was unrefuted that
the appellants walked over the premises prior to the initial
deposit receipt and certainly occupied the premises before
executing the final documents of purchase.
sition, page 46, lines 3-9).

(Mr. Jones depo-

They thereafter occupied the

premises for three and one-half (3-l/2) years before making any
claim against the third-party defendants for injuries or damage
they claimed to have sustained by reason of what they, in February, 1977, labelled the third-party defendants fraud and breach
of fiduciary duty.

(R. 339)

Jones should have discovered that he did not have 22 3/4
acres by at least August, 1973.

He had been in possession

since the latter part of June; the land was available and obvious
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to him and he inspected it.

(rlr. Jones deposition, page 59,

lines 20-25, page 60 line 1).

Jones explanation is simply

that while he bought what he though he bought, he thought
that the land constituted 22 3/4 acres.

He does not contend

that he did not get what was pointed out to him as the property dimensions.

(Mr. Jones deposition, page 59, lines 13-25,

page 60, lines l-6).

He merely contends that he thought that

that which he was buying was 22 3/4 acres instead of 6 even
though he knew exactly what he was buying in respects to metes
and bounds.
Jones does not seek rescision or restitution.
tent with what he bought.

He is con-

He merely wants an acreage price for

the number of acres he claims he did not get.

I t is settled

in Utah that:
One who claims to be defrauded must exercise
reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering
it and seeking a remedy therefore, or be precluded
from doing so.
One who has entered into a contract where
fraud may be involved and after having knowledge
of those facts continues to perform or otherwise
ratify the contract, is deemed to have waived
the claim of fraud.
Bezner v. Continental Dry
Cleaners, Inc. 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976).
See also Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey
Construct~on, Inc, 97 Id.
216, 541 P.2d 1184
(1975)
Further, it is clear that: Actual knowledge of fraud is not a
prerequisite of ratification; notice of acts and cicumstances
which would put a man of ordinary prudence and intelligence upon
inquiry is equivalent in the eyes of the law to knowledge of
all the facts a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose.
Housley v. Linton Plywood Association, 210 Ore. 520, 311 P.2d
432 (1957)
Judge Bullock, therefore, was well within the parameters
of the testimony and evidence when he observed in his tentative
decision:
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However, by entering into possession and remaining in possession from July, 1973, to the present
time, and accepting the benefits from their purchase, i.e., use and occupation of the property
and operating the store, and further, by paying
regular monthly payments called for by the note
for more than three years after entering into
possession; and by now declining to amend the
third-party complaint to pray for rescision of
the contract the court believes the acreage deficiency has been waived.
The appellants, by their pleading, and by their conduct,
specifically waived any right against the third-party defendants based upon breach of fiduciary duty or fraud.
POINT V
APPELLANTS FAILED TO ALLEGE A CLAIM OF FRAUD OR
MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS.
In searching the complaint of the appellants it is apparent that they have not alleged with particularity and with
certainty the misrepresentations made by these defendants nor
have they alleged what they deemed to be the truth juxtaposed
against the representations of fraud.
not sustain an action for fraud.

Such deficiencies can-

Utah Rules of Civil Proce-

dure 8(c), 9(b).
For example, the complaint is absolutely devoid of any
reference of fraud or breach of fiduciary duties by the defendant Lester Clan Stilson.

The entire contention of the appel-

lants against Stilson seems to be that he was a supervisor of
Oberhansly.

There is no dispute that he knew nothing of the

transaction until the fall of 1976.

The complaint is totally

devoid of any suggestion that defendant United Farm Agency,
knew or should have known, participated in, acquiesced in, or
ractified any of the conduct of Oberhansly which is deemed to
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be fraudulent or a breach of duty.

There is nothing in the

complaint that would allow the court to enter judgment
against either Stilson or United Farm Agency based upon
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.
In respect to Oberhansly, the allegations of fraud are
totally deficient.

An inspection of the lengthy complaint,

including Counts I, II, III and IV will demonstrate clearly
that the pleading is totally inadequate in alleging a claim
of fraud.
Counts III and IV simply state that Oberhansly occupied
a fiduciary and confidential relationship to the third-party
plaintiffs and that he breached his duty.

The apparent breaches

presumably were those alleged in Counts I and II which were
incorporated by reference to wit:

that Oberhansly knew or

should have known that the plaintiff did not own 22-3/4 acres
and that he subsequently discovered that the plaintiffs had
breached their oral agreement to convey one acre of ground.
Such allegations are simply not actionable.

This court has

clearly set forth the requirement for the allegation of fraud
in Stuck v.

Delta Land and Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227,

P.791 (1924), and later in Davis Stock Company v. Hill,
2c~

288 P.2d 988 (1954).

2 Utah

Appellants have failed to meet these

requirements.
CONCLUSION
The appellants have failed to state a claim against
these third-party defendants upon which relief can be granted.
Tl1<•

appellants further failed to introduce evidence or testimony
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that would allow a judgment against these third-party defendants.

The third-party defendants therefore, as a matter of

law, had to be dismissed from the action and the trial court
had no other alternative under the status of the pleadings
and the evidence before it.
Assuming arguendo that the appellants were entitled to a
jury trial or that appellants were entitled to present expert
testimony as to the value of the property, they nevertheless
would have been barred from obtaining judgment against these
third-party defendants by reason of the failures above enunciated.

Were the inadequacies of the pleadings or the failures

of proof insufficient to bar the appellants, they would nevertheless be barred by their acts and conduct in accepting the
deed, signing the mortgage, and occupying the premises for

more than 3-l/2 years before complaining of what they belatedly
deem to be the third-party defendants fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.

The acts and conduct of the appellants are incon-

sistent with the allegations.
The dismissal of the third-party defendants by the District
Court was proper.

The judgment of the District Court in this

respect, therefore, should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

~day

of July, 1979.
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MAILED POSTAGE PREPAID a copy of the foregoing Respondents'
Brief this

bl, QtJ.

day of July, 1979 to each of the following:

J. Kent Holland

Attorney for Appellants
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN
702 Kearns Building
salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Ray E. Nash
Attorney for Respondents
Dugans
33 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
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